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ages. After establishing that its review of the trial court's jury instructions is highly deferential and that it will not disturb the trial court absent an abuse of discretion, the court agreed with the lower court's
judgment that, given the nature of testimony regarding the view of the
river, such an instruction was necessary to prevent confusion to the
jury. The court held that the instruction was neither misleading, nor
misstated the law, and found no error.
For the foregoing reasons, the court affirmed the district court ruling, holding that the City's construction of the bridge constituted a
taking of landowners' riparian fights, that Indiana does not recognize
a riparian right to an unobstructed view, and accordingly, that jury instructions not to consider any loss of view when determining damages
was not in error.
Jeff McGaughran
Lukis v. Ray, 888 N.E.2d 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding the various
standards for determining the riparian zones of contiguous lakefront
properties are fluid and best applied on a case-by-case basis depending
on the characteristics of the shoreline and position of the property
with respect to the shoreline).
The dispute between appellant-respondent Michael Lukis ("Lukis")
and appellees-petitioners Dean Ray, John Blackburn and Thomas
Blackburn (the "Blackburns"), involved the the parties' riparian rights
as owners of contiguous shoreline properties. Lukis's property was on
the western boundary of the Blackburns' property and Ray's property
was on the eastern boundary of the Blackburns' property. All of the
parties' lots were irregularly shaped, and none of the lots intersected
the lake at right angles. Ray's and the Blackburns' properties were part
of the Gleneyre Association ("Association") and subject to the Association's constitution, bylaws, and restrictive covenants.
The conflict arose when Lukis installed a pier measuring eightynine feet long and twenty-seven feet wide, which was located ten feet
closer to the Blackburns' property than the prior owners' pier. Consequently, the Blackburns had to relocate their pier thirty feet farther
east, which left Ray with no access to the lake from the west side of his
pier. Ray had to shorten his pier by twenty feet and park his boat on
the east side of his pier, outside of his property boundaries with the
permission of his neighbors.
Following Lukis's refusal to decrease the size of his pier or move his
pier westward, Ray instituted an action with the Indiana Natural Resources Commission ("NRC") to resolve the dispute. In response to
Ray's claim, Lukis filed a counterclaim against Ray and .a cross-claim
against the Blackburns alleging unreasonable interference with his
riparian rights.
On June 8, 2006, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") conducted a
hearing and issued a non-final order on August 16, 2006. The ALJ
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found that no set rules exist for determining the extension of property
boundaries into a lake, and that courts have used two general principles to make this determination. The first principle, as stated in Bath
v. Courts, applies to properties with boundaries perpendicular to a relatively straight shoreline. In this situation, "the boundaries are determined by extending the onshore property boundaries" into the lake.
The second principle, as applied in Nosek v. Stryker, states that the
boundary lines "should divide the available navigable waterfront in
proportion to the amount of shoreline of each owner." This principle
is applied when the shoreline is irregular because drawing lines at right
angles to the shoreline would not result in a just apportionment of the
property owners' boundaries. Lastly, while the court did not address
how far the boundaries of the parties' riparian zones extended into a
lake, it stated that the determination would be made using the "reasonableness" test, which accommodates the various characteristics of
Indiana lakes versus using depth or length to determine the boundaries.
Despite the irregularity of the parties' shoreline, the ALJ found
that extending the onshore property lines into the lake still resulted in
a just apportionment between the properties based on the owners' respective shorelines. The ALJ also found that the Association's covenant governing the determination of riparian zones of lakefront owners was consistent with the decision to extend the onshore property
lines into the lake. While Ray argued that Lukis' pier was longer and
wider than other piers in the area, the ALJ found that the lengths and
widths of piers in the area vary and that the evidence did not support
Ray's assertion.
Ray and the Blackburns filed written objections to the non-final
order; however, the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act Committee of the NRC issued a final order adopting the ALJ's non-final
order. On review, the trial court concluded that the ALJ erred by extending the onshore property boundaries into the lake to establish the
parties' respective riparian zones. The trial court found that the ALJ
should have applied the apportionment method of establishing the
riparian zones because the shorelines at issue were not straight. That
method allocates navigable waterfronts in proportion to the width of
the property owner's shoreline. On September 24, 2007, after a hearing, the trial court remanded the dispute to the NRC holding that the
ALJ's decision was contrary to law. Lukisappealed the trial court's order.
The Court of Appeals of Indiana began its discussion by explaining
four general rights associated with riparian ownership in Indiana. The
court stated a riparian owner has "(1) the right of access to navigable
water; (2) the right to build a pier out to the line of navigability; (3)
the right to accretions; and (4) the right to reasonable use of the water
for general purposes .

. . ."

Based on the principles set forth in Bath
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and Nosek, the court agreed with the trial court and the ALJ that no set
rule exists for establishing the property boundaries into a lake between
contiguous shoreline properties. While the court found that the apportionment method of determining riparian rights was appropriate,
the State of Indiana has never adopted this as the fixed rule for establishing the riparian zones of contiguous shoreline property owners.
Therefore, the court found that the trial court erred in its conclusion
that the NRC's decision to forgo the apportionment method was contrary to law.
Lastly, while Ray argued that he lacked exclusive access to navigable water, and that the NRC decision effectively resulted in a taking of
property, the court declined to address these issues. Ultimately, the
court reversed the trial court's holding because it found that the NRC's
determination of the parties' riparian zones was appropriate.
Kimberly Folk
LOUISIANA
Hamel's Farm, L.L.C. v. Muslow, 988 So. 2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir.
2008) (holding that an avulsion which changes land and water borders
does not deprive a landowner of title to real property, and to obtain
land via acquisitive prescription one must exclusively use every part of a
property for the requisite time frame).
Hamel's Farm, L.L.C. ("Hamel's Farm") brought action to quiet
title, and sought the court to declare it the owner of 12.62 acres of
property, the majority of which was covered by a lake. The First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo found that the defendants,
Ike and Bertie Muslow ("the Muslows"), were the owners of the portion
of the property under the lake's surface, but that Hamel's Farm had
acquired ownership of the dry property via acquisitive prescription.
Hamel's Farm appealed ownership of the portion underwater to the
Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Muslows
cross-appealed the judgment, asserting they were owners of the dry
portion. Both parties, as the basis for appeal, stated they had lawful
ownership of the entire property through valid tile, or alternatively,
through acquisitive prescription. Hamel's Farm also argued that it
acquired the property when alluvion formed the land.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's holding for clear or
manifest error. The court first examined each party's title. Hamel's
Farm presented two deeds to support its position: one from 1941, and
another from 1957 conveying the property to Hamel's Farm. Although
the deeds mentioned several parcels of land by their common names,
they did not name the property in dispute by its common name, Dixie
Gardens. The Muslows' title was traceable back to a 1928 deed that
named Dixie Gardens and the plats in dispute. The court upheld as
reasonable the trial court's finding that the Muslows held valid tile.

